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In this paper we review the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of mental health (DSM),
its scientiﬁc bases and utility. The concepts of “normality,” “pathology,” and boundaries
between them are critically reviewed. We further use the concepts of mindfulness and
mindlessness, and evidence from cognitive and social sciences to investigate the DSM
clinical and social impact and we argue against its assigned overpower. We recommend
including alternative perspectives to the DSM, such as mindfulness and positive psychol-
ogy. We also argue for including mindfulness training in psychiatric residency and clinical
psychology programs.
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THE DSM
TheDiagnosticandStatisticalManualof MentalDisorders(DSM)
is considered the most important document for the diagnosis and
the classiﬁcation of mental disorders. Despite the existence of
alternative diagnostic criteria and approaches [e.g., International
Statistical Classiﬁcation of Diseases (ICD), Psychodynamic Diag-
nosticManual(PDM)],theDSMcriteriaremainthegoldstandard
for mental health diagnosis. It is published by the American Psy-
chiatricAssociation(APA),whoseinitialobjectivewastoestablish
a nosology of mental disorders that can constitute a common lan-
guage among clinicians, researchers, health insurance companies,
and the pharmaceutical industry. Five versions and two revisions
of the manual were published since 1952, the last one being its
ﬁfth edition published in May 18, 2013. Since its ﬁrst draft, the
DSMwentthroughmanymodiﬁcations. Forexamplethenumber
of proclaimed mental disorders went from 108 in its ﬁrst version
(1952), to 182 in DSM-II published in 1968, to 265 in DSM-III
published in 1980, followed by its revision DSM-III-R in 1987
with 292 diagnoses,to 354 categories in the DSM-IV published in
1994, followed by its revision DSM-IV-R in 2000 with no signif-
icant modiﬁcations, and lastly the DSM-5, which did not change
signiﬁcantly the number of disorders but rather the criteria (or
thresholds) of diagnoses, leading to a potential inﬂation of some
diagnosisupto28%(Keelyetal.,2008;CorcoranandWalsh,2010;
Millon etal., 2010; Frances, 2013; Greenberg, 2013). Along with
the increasing number of disorders, the manual went from 130
pages in its ﬁrst edition to 886 pages in its fourth and 991 in its
current edition, this was accompanied with a substantial growth
in the price, sales, and revenues of DSM for the APA reaching
between $5 and $6 million annually,almost 10% of its global rev-
enue (Greenberg, 2013, p. 110). The income from the DSM for
the APA is very trivial in comparison with the income for the
pharmaceutical industry, which exceeds $18 billion a year in sales
of psychotropic medication, with more than $12 billion a year
from antidepressants sales only (Frances,2013,p. 89). Beyond the
numbers and facts concerning the DSM, which were extensively
addressed elsewhere (e.g., Frances, 2013; Greenberg, 2013), there
is an ongoing debate inside the scientiﬁc and clinical communi-
ties about the DSM science and utility. This papers aims to shed
more light on the science and utility of the DSM categories, while
suggesting other possibilities and alternative approaches.
THE SCIENCE AND UTILITY OF THE DSM
A central aim of the DSM taskforce was to set appropriate cut-
off points between what is considered “normal” from what is
“pathological,” in order to treat the individuals belonging to the
latter category. The concept of pathology is an aprioristic deﬁni-
tion, originally based on statistical distribution (the“S”in DSM),
withanarbitrarydecisionthatisnotscientiﬁcallydriven(Frances,
2013, p. 24). In fact, the criteria set for cut-offs between “nor-
mal” and “pathological” (e.g., number of symptoms, frequency
and duration of symptoms, and nature/duration of dysfunction
associated with the proclaimed disorder) are also “arbitrary” and
subjective because there is no laboratory test or biological mark-
ers to set the boundary between “normal” and “pathological.” In
addition, there is not scientiﬁc link between basic science (e.g.,
cognitive, neurological and social science) and clinical psychiatry.
Second,culturesdifferdramaticallyintheirconceptionofnormal-
ity; what is“normal”in one culture can be considered“abnormal”
or“pathological”in another one. In addition,there are signiﬁcant
within-and-between cultural differences in the manner in which
diagnosticcategoriesareinterpretedanddiagnosticlabelsareused
(e.g., Zubin, 1967; Rosenhan, 1973; Crow, 1986; Zinbarg etal.,
1994; Keller etal., 1995). For example, the APA deﬁned homosex-
uality as a mental disorder until the DSM-II in 1973 (Greener,
2013). Third, manifestations (named symptoms in the DSM)
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and behaviors are contextually embedded and vary dramatically
accordingtothesituation,forexample,aggressivebehaviorcanbe
well-adapted in one context but not in another one. Even if the
DSM partially addresses this issue, subtle contextual differences
may create several diagnostic biases. Last,when normality is set in
relationship to the ability of understanding reality (i.e.,in the def-
inition of psychosis and dissociative disorders), it is arguable that
reality itself is constantly changing and hard or even impossible to
grasp.
From another side, studies regarding the prevalence of men-
tal disorders using the DSM categories did not provide coherent
results,asitwouldbeexpected.Infact,thereareseveraldifferences
when comparing the prevalence rates obtained. For example, ret-
rospective studies suggested that the annual prevalence of DSM
psychiatric disorders is around 30% in adults younger than 55
years and projected a lifetime prevalence rate of 50% for a psy-
chiatric disorder by 75 years of age (Kessler etal.,2005). However,
these rates seem to be an underestimation as evidence of forget-
ting is common for recall beyond 6 months (e.g., Harlow and
Linet,1989;PillemerandWhite,1989;AngoldandCostello,1996).
Therefore,prospectivestudiescanbemoreaccurate(Mofﬁttetal.,
2010; Copeland etal., 2011). Using prospective methodology,
the cumulative prevalence of DSM-IV deﬁned categories among
1037 individuals during a 15-year prospective longitudinal study
(between age 18 and 32) yielded to 50% for an anxiety disorder,
41% for depression, 32% for alcohol dependence, and 18% for
cannabis dependence (Mofﬁtt etal., 2010). Another prospective
longitudinal study assessing 1420 participants for nine times from
9 through 21 years of age yielded to 61.1% for a well-speciﬁed
psychiatric disorder.An additional,21.4% had met the criteria for
a not otherwise speciﬁed disorder only, increasing the cumulative
prevalence for any disorder to 82.5% (Copeland etal., 2011). In
the youngest cohort, the cumulative prevalence for any disorder
was higher than 90% (Copeland etal., 2011). In addition, there
is evidence of a mounting epidemic of mental disorders in the
last 15 years. In fact, childhood bipolar disorder increased 40-
fold (Moreno etal., 2007), autism increased by 20-fold, attention
deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has tripled (Bloom etal.,
2011), and adult bipolar disorder doubled (Ketter, 2010). These
data add more confusion about the efﬁcacy of the DSM in delin-
eating “normality” from “pathology” as some of these statistics
suggest that almost all of the population has mental disorders.
The DSM-5 taskforce aimed to address this problem by imple-
menting a dimensional aspect to the DSM that was supposed
to reﬂect a continuum view of mental disorders rather than a
categorical one. However, not only the taskforce failed to fully
implement dimensions in the new DSM but also kept its cate-
gorical aspect and reduced the thresholds for many diagnostic
criteria, which can lead to a wide increase in pathologizing previ-
ouslyconsidered“normal”individuals(Frances,2013)makingthe
population almost totally saturated with mental disorders. These
argumentstakentogetherraiseseriousquestionsregardingthesci-
encebehindtheDSM,speciﬁcallyitsreliability,validityandclinical
utility.
In fact multiple reviews questioned the reliability and the
validity of many DSM categories. For example, Blom and
Oberink (2012) found that the construct validity of DSM-IV
post-traumatic stress disorders (PTSD) in children and adoles-
cents varies among different criteria: where some are highly
valid (e.g., stressor criterion), while others are not (e.g., avoid-
ance, detachment from others, and difﬁculty falling or staying
asleep). In addition, some non-DSM criteria (e.g., guilt) had
better validity than existing ones (e.g., avoidance and emotional
numbing criterion). Vieta and Phillips (2007) argued that the
content,concurrent,discriminant,andpredictivevalidityof bipo-
lar disorder are problematic suggesting a need to improve and
reﬁne diagnostic criteria. Woo and Rey (2005) found that the
validity of the inattentive and hyperactive-impulsive subtypes
of ADHD is not fully supported in the DSM-IV pointing to a
deﬁcit in data on treatment of the inattentive and hyperactive-
impulsive subtypes. In conjunction with these results, a meta-
analysis involving 546 studies concluded that DSM-IV ADHD
subtypes do not identify discrete subgroups with sufﬁcient long-
term stability to justify the classiﬁcation of distinct forms of
the disorder. In summary, many reviews were highly critical of
the DSM, while few others supported some DSM criteria [e.g.,
validity of atypical depression Lam and Stewart (1996); cross-
cultural construct validity of ADHD in children and adolescents
Willcutt (2012)].
These results taken together are particularly disappointing
especially that the DSM went through multiple modiﬁcations and
ameliorations in the last sixty years. In that line, Laungani (2002)
argued that the popularity and extensive use of the DSM is
not an indication of its reliability or validity. A theory, accord-
ing to Lakatos (1970) may be true, even if no one believes
in it, and it may be false, even if everyone believes in it.
In addition, a low congruence was found between DSM-IV
and International Diagnostic Interview (ICD-10) for many psy-
chiatric categories including schizophrenia, schizoaffective dis-
order, bipolar disorder and depression (e.g., Cheniaux etal.,
2009). Moreover, the rising number of individuals qualifying
for at least one psychiatric disorder during lifetime renders
the boundaries between “normal” and “pathological” illusive
and nulliﬁes the DSM validity and its principal reason for
existence.
A second aim for the DSM is supposed to be clinical, i.e., set-
ting a common language among clinicians in order to encourage
collaboration and improving treatments for individuals with a
diagnosisof amentaldisorder.However,itisquestionablewhythe
DSMlabelsareneededtofurtherclinicalhelpforpatients.Among
the arguments for the use of psychiatric labels is that they are
simple, easy, clear, quick, and convenient to use. If this argument
is true, it is equally problematic as a simple and quick label can
be automatically used without in-depth mental processing. This
is particularly precarious speciﬁcally with the previously shown
prevalenceofpsychiatricdiagnosesamongthegeneralpopulation.
Many scholars and clinicians have argued that psychiatric
labels serve only the interests of clinicians and their profes-
sional associations (e.g., APA) as well as the pharmaceutical
industry (Greenberg, 2013), whereas these labels can have dev-
astating effects of the individuals receiving them (e.g., Frances,
2013, p. 109). In fact, labels can create self-fulﬁlling prophe-
cies (Rosenthal and Fode, 1963), reducing expectations, ambi-
tions, and changing other’s perceptions and behaviors toward
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the individual carrying the label (Smith, 2002). Ben-Zeev etal.
(2010) identiﬁed three types of stigma resulting from DSM diag-
noses: public stigma, self-stigma, and label avoidance (Corrigan
andWatson,2002; Corrigan etal.,2004). Public stigma is the phe-
nomenon of large social groups endorsing negative stereotypes
about, and subsequently acting against, a stigmatized group: in
this case, people with a diagnosis of mental disorder. Self-stigma
is the loss of self-esteem and self-efﬁcacy that occurs when the
individuals internalize public stigma, which may prevent them
from pursuing their life goals (Corrigan, 2006). Label avoidance
is the phenomenon leading individuals to avoid mental health
services in order to avoid the deleterious impact of a stigmatiz-
ing label. In addition, three processes can further exacerbate the
stigma associated with psychiatric labels (Ben-Zeev etal., 2010).
The ﬁrst is groupness deﬁned as the degree to which a collec-
tion of people is perceived as a uniﬁed or meaningful entity
(Campbell,1958;HamiltonandSherman,1996).Diagnosisdistin-
guishespeoplewithamentaldisorderfromthegeneralpopulation
and adds to the salience of their groupness (Link and Phelan,
2001). Research has also shown a non-speciﬁc prejudice against
people who have a psychiatric disorder compared with people
with other health conditions (Weiner etal., 1988; Corrigan etal.,
2000). In addition, diagnostic labels can serve as priming for
automatic negative stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Bargh etal.,
1996). Negative attitudes were also shown to be automatically
activated among therapists (Abreu, 1999). Moreover, diagnostic
labels of severe mental illness such as schizophrenia and psy-
chosis seem to worsen the level of prejudice and this is even
worsefollowingaﬁrstpsychoticepisode(Crispetal.,2000;Phelan
etal., 2000; Birchwood etal., 2007; Lolich and Leiderman, 2008;
Reed,2008). The second is homogeneity,where out-groups mem-
bers are seen more homogeneous than in-groups (Tajfel, 1978;
Rothbart etal., 1997; Ashton and Esses, 1999). Categorization or
groupness was also shown to increase negative stereotypes against
out-group members (Link and Phelan, 2001); however, there can
be causal bidirectional relationship between both (Yzerbyt etal.,
1997; Crawford etal., 2002). The third is stability, meaning the
traits that describe group members are believed to remain rela-
tively stable and unchanging (Anderson, 1991; Kashima, 2000).
Stability also supports the idea that psychiatric diagnoses are
unchanging and that individuals are less likely to overcome them
in comparison with those with physical illnesses (Weiner etal.,
1988; Corrigan etal., 2000). This pessimistic view of stability is
even worse in the case of severe mental illness (e.g., psychosis
and schizophrenia; Harding and Zahniser, 1994). Taken together,
these processes can lead to an overgeneralization error, where all
members of a group are expected to manifest the same character-
istics attributed to that group (Ben-Zeev etal., 2010). In addition
psychiatric diagnoses when delivered rigidly, and uncondition-
ally (without being related to speciﬁc contexts) are likely to yield
to internal, stable, incontrollable and global negative attributions
about the self, modifying self-concept and leading to a sense of
hopelessness and learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975), which
ironically was shown to be related to another popular DSM cat-
egory, that is, major depressive disorder (MDD; e.g., Maiden,
1987;HealyandWilliams,1988;Duman,2010;VollmayrandGass,
2013).
Taking into consideration the negative effects of psychiatric
labels,whichseemtooutweighanyclaimedbeneﬁts,itislegitimate
toreconsidertheirclinicalutilityandtheiradvantagescomparedto
directdescriptionsofthephenomenologicalexperienceofindivid-
ualsseekingpsychiatricorpsychologicalhelp.Forexample,simple
and direct experiential descriptors namely, emotions of sadness,
worry, fear, anger, disgust, terror, and lack of energy, motivation,
pleasure,and hope as well as speciﬁc thought patterns (e.g.,rumi-
nation, over-generalization, and pessimism), physical sensations
(e.g.,fatigue,exhaustion,palpitations,fainting,andsleeplessness),
cognitive processing (e.g., inattention, distraction, and memory
loss), and behaviors (e.g., avoidance, isolation, or aggression)
are common among individuals and provide better insight for
appropriate treatment than abstract psychiatric constructs (e.g.,
depression, anxiety, borderline, and psychosis). In addition, the
attention of the clinician must be particularly directed toward the
distress and suffering experienced by the individual and toward
the mental/behavioral processes that maintain and exacerbate the
suffering (e.g., mind-wandering, identiﬁcation with one’s own
thoughts, acting in opposite ways of personal values, and lack
of self-acceptance and compassion).
In conjunction with their clinical utility, DSM categories are
been argued to be particularly useful for pharmacological treat-
ment. Perhaps this is the best use of psychiatric diagnoses.
However, scientiﬁc research remains unclear and controversial
about the beneﬁts of a speciﬁc type of medication for a spe-
ciﬁc psychiatric diagnosis and psychotropic medications such
as antidepressants and antipsychotics are been prescribed for a
multitude of psychiatric disorders, including sleeping, anxiety,
depression, irritability, eccentricity, temper tantrums in youth,
and crankiness of old age (Frances, 2013, p. 105). In addition, the
psychotropic prescribing industry is being one of the fast grow-
ing, ﬁnancing a large part of DSM related research activities and
ﬁnancingAPA itself,leading to important questions regarding the
clinicalnecessityof suchgrowthanditsdubiousethicsspeciﬁcally
thatsomeofthesedrugscanbedangerouscausingmassiveobesity,
diabetes,heart disease,and a shortened life span (Laungani,2002;
Frances, 2013, p. 89; Greenberg, 2013). Beside these concerns,
and despite of the little scientiﬁc knowledge regarding the mecha-
nisms of actions of most of the prescribed medications,empirical
ﬁndings support their utility for many individuals in speciﬁc
contexts. According to that, it will be irresponsible and uneth-
ical to advise individuals stopping their medications; however,
more scientiﬁc and ethical boundaries must be implemented in
order to reduce unnecessary prescription and to fully explain to
individuals the state of knowledge regarding the possible ben-
eﬁts as well as negative short and long-term effects of these
medications.
Another proclaimed utility for the DSM categories is the
advancement of clinical research. This is true in the scope that a
largenumberofstudieswoulduseDSMcategories.However,most
oftheresearchoutcomesaremeasuredusingquantitativedata,i.e.,
raw numbers resulting from administering speciﬁc clinical mea-
sures, e.g., Beck Depression Inventory (Beck etal., 1961, 1996;
Beck and Streer, 1987), Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck and Streer,
1993), and qualitative data, mostly obtained through clinical
interviews.
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A last utility for the DSM is proclaimed to be legal as many
of the diagnoses have implications within the legal system (e.g.,
paraphilia). However, despite their use today, it is not advis-
able for health science to be part of the legal debates in courts
as it further undermines its primary role of treating individuals
(Dawes, 1994). Other utilities are within the ﬁnancial, political
and social domains (e.g., health insurance); however, a review of
these beneﬁts is outside the scope of the current paper.
In summary,the DSM,when thoroughly investigated,yields to
some support regarding its reliability but leads to serious ques-
tions about its validity, utility, and ethics. These ﬁndings cannot
justify the overuse of DSM in mental health neither the power nor
authority assigned to the DSM categories besides being only of
ﬁnancial and sociopolitical reasons.
THE DSM: MINDFUL OR MINDLESS?
The discussion about the DSM could be seen in the light of the
conceptsof mindfulness/mindlessness(Langer,1989,1997,2012).
Mindlessnessisdescribedasadefaultstyleofcognitivefunctioning
in which individuals process cues from the environment in a rela-
tively automatic but inﬂexible manner,without reference to novel
aspects of these cues (Langer and Piper,1987). By default,old cat-
egoriesandpreviouslymadedistinctionsarereliedonuncritically,
leading to rigid behavior that is rule governed rather than rule
guided. In contrast, mindfulness is described as a general style or
modeof functioningthroughwhichindividualsactivelyengagein
reconstructing the environment by creating new categories or dis-
tinctions, and seeking multiple perspectives, thus directing atten-
tion to new contextual cues that may be consciously controlled
or manipulated as appropriate (Langer, 1989, 1997, 2012). There
is growing evidence for the adaptive inﬂuence of mindful func-
tioning on learning, health, and social behavior and, conversely,
forthedeleteriouseffectsof mindlessness(e.g.,Langeretal.,1978,
1985, 2012; Langer and Newman, 1979; Langer and Piper, 1987;
Langer, 1989,1992a,b,1997,2000,2009,2012).
Itisbeensuggestedthatamindfulapproachtolanguage,where
individuals are made aware of alternative perspectives and con-
ceptions of what is being said or written, leads to more control
and better outcomes (Langer and Piper, 1987; Langer, 1992a).
The DSM is an example from the opposite side, being written
usinganabsoluteunconditionallanguageleadingtoanarrowper-
spective of the complex human mental conditions and states by
labeling some of these conditions as mental disorders. In fact,
the DSM embraced a single intrapersonal deﬁnition of mental
conditions, considering them as internal ﬂaws, due to biological
defects, maladaptation to the society, and/or personality difﬁcul-
ties, minimizing or denying at times the implication of external
(environmental, interpersonal and social) factors and trivializing
the lack of support facing a large number of“normal”individuals
in Western societies today. For example, many of the cognitive
and functional limitations perceived in the elderly can be due to
non-adapted environment, an environment designed by young
adults for young adults and not for the elderly (Langer, 2009).
In the social sciences, this phenomenon is known as the funda-
mental attribution error, deﬁned as the tendency to place a heavy
emphasis on internal characteristics to explain someone else’s
behavior in a given situation, rather than considering external
situational factors (Jones and Harris, 1967; Ross, 1977a). Fun-
damental attribution error is further committed when attention
is fully directed toward the behavior of someone else, speciﬁ-
cally when it is evaluated as deviant (Smith and Miller, 1979;
Robinson and McArthur, 1982; Lassiter etal., 2002), when the
evaluator is in an automatic (mindless) mental mode (Winter
and Uleman, 1984; Uleman, 1987; Moskowitz, 1993; Newman,
1993; Carlston and Skowronski, 1994), or the evaluator lacks
energy or motivation (e.g., Gilbert, 1989), and is more present
in individualistic cultures (e.g., North-American) in compari-
son with collectivist cultures (e.g., Asian; Miller, 1984; Michael
and Kaiping, 1994; Morris and Peng, 1994; Masuda and Nis-
bett, 2001; Langdridge and Trevor, 2004). In addition, the DSM
mindlessly focuses on the inabilities or limitations of the diag-
nosed individuals without outweighing their shortcomings with
their abilities, talents and resilience. Moreover, the DSM does
not acknowledge change across time, but rather focuses on sta-
ble traits (e.g., in deﬁning personality disorders). Being blind
to the reality of continuous change is another aspect of mind-
lessness (Bodner and Langer, 2001). The single perspective of
the DSM can exacerbate prejudice toward already negatively
stereotyped individuals (e.g., individuals with a diagnosis of
mental retardation; Reiss, 2000) and can contribute in justify-
ing the under-investment of governments and health agencies in
underprivileged individuals (Laungani, 2002), by rending their
suffering as their own fault and responsibility and by labeling
them as“abnormal and deviant”(Reiss,2000; Pilgrim and Rogers,
2005). Such mindless application of diagnostic criteria is con-
sistent with data on illusory correlations and psychodiagnostic
tests (e.g., Chapman and Chapman, 1967, 1969; Dowling and
Graham, 1976; Mirels, 1976), where illusory correlations (i.e.,
non-existing, over-evaluated or even opposite correlations) seem
to persist even with the passage of time blinding the diagnosti-
cian in the face of contradictory reality. This phenomenon was
present not only in projective and non-empirical psychological
tests (e.g., Wheeler-Rorschach; Chapman and Chapman, 1969)
but equally in empirical test batteries (e.g., Minnesota Multipha-
sic Personality Inventory – MMPI; Dowling and Graham, 1976)
and was shown to be more pronounced among more experienced
diagnosticians than novice ones (Dowling and Graham, 1976).
A possible explanation of this phenomenon is premature cogni-
tivecommitment(ChanowitzandLanger,1981),wherepreviously
created categories are available for mindless use (e.g., Langer
and Imber, 1979), even if information is presented in a single
instance (e.g., Chanowitz and Langer, 1980). This phenomenon
was shown to worsen with time (i.e., with the exposure to previ-
ouslylearnedmaterial)asinthecaseofexperienceddiagnosticians
(Dowling and Graham, 1976). This is particularly true when
information is presented in an absolute, unconditional, author-
itarian, and stable manner (Langer and Piper, 1987), which is
the case of most psychodiagnostic tests and the DSM diagnostic
criteria. Absolute diagnostic categories encourage habit, reduce
uncertainty and unpleasant insecurity among diagnosticians but
at the same time render it difﬁcult for them to produce alter-
native, novice perceptions, distinctions or categories, making
them mindlessly following previously established rules and cat-
egories without doubting or questioning these rules. In addition,
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medicalresidentsandgraduatepsychologystudentsarelessprone
to learn when taught with unconditional material (e.g., using
DSM categories; Langer, 1997, 2000). Moreover, when presented
with absolute diagnostic labels from a trusted ﬁgure of scientiﬁc
authority (e.g., psychiatrist, psychologist or other mental health
professionals), the individual receiving the label, even though,
she is more mindful about her condition, will most likely give-
up personal control accepting the label mindlessly and resigning
powerlessly to its consequences, which can be devastative in
many cases. In such dynamic of clinician power, authority and
knowledge versus unpowered and diagnostic-naive “patient”, it
is highly likely that the latter will experience a lack of personal
control, self-determination, in addition to the shame, stigma and
infringement to self-dignity and self-esteem,with powerful physi-
calandmentalnegativeconsequences.Acounter-mechanismisto
increase the control of individuals on their own health whether
physical or mental, which was shown to have powerful posi-
tive consequences (Langer and Rodin, 1976; Rodin and Langer,
1977).
According to social science, the DSM can be considered as a
perfectexampleof actor–observerbias(Kelley,1967;Nisbettetal.,
1973; Ross,1977b;Watson,1982; Jones and Nisbett,1987; Gilbert,
1995), which refers to the tendency of emphasizing internal, dis-
positional causes (e.g., personality traits) when explaining others’
behavior but considering own behavior to stem primarily from
external, situational factors (e.g., being under stress). Malle etal.
(2007) and Malle (2004, 2006) suggested a contribution of cogni-
tiveaccessandbeliefs(e.g.,thelackofcontext-speciﬁcinformation
and the use of heuristics) among observers due to motivational
differences with actors. This deﬁnition when applied to a non-
contextually based DSM,and considering the possible motivation
of the DSM users, suggests an increase in mindless use of DSM
categories among mental health professionals. Laungani (2002)
argued that conceptions of normality derived through the use of
the DSM are, to a large extent, based on notions of social confor-
mity. When clinicians are referring only to social conventions and
previously learned information (e.g., DSM categories) in mak-
ing their mind about their perceived “mentally ill” patients, they
are less prone to seek novel information and less likely to have
an open and curious orientation toward their patients’ environ-
ment. Such mindless orientation towards the past may lead to
misdiagnosis,mistreatment,and seriously compromise the thera-
peuticalliancebetweentheprofessionalandtheindividualseeking
help.
In summary, the DSM is not only a mindless categorization of
mental conditions, but also the way in which it is taught to men-
tal health professionals encourages a mindless use of the DSM
categories. That is similar to a widely diffused approach toward
medical data, which is collected, justiﬁed, accepted, and used
uncritically and mindlessly (Langer, 2012).
BEYOND THE DSM
FewattemptsweremadeinWesternsciencestounderstandhuman
mentalconditionsandsufferingbeyonddiagnosticcategories. For
example, Millon etal. (2010, Chap. 30) tried to extend the cri-
teria of borderline personality disorder (as deﬁned in the DSM)
by including evolutionary, social, and cultural factors recognizing
the diversity of the syndrome. However, the authors did not con-
sidertheabilitiesandresilienceof individualswiththeproclaimed
syndrome.
An alternative model was also proposed in positive psychol-
ogy (e.g., Peterson and Seligman, 2004) categorizing a set of
24 personality traits of “character strength and virtues.” Among
these traits are: creativity, curiosity, open-mindedness, wisdom,
love, kindness, social intelligence, forgiveness, humility, self-
regulation, and gratitude. It is noteworthy that many of these
traits are related to mindfulness, whether deﬁned according to
Eastern tradition (e.g., Baer etal., 2004, 2006; Hutcherson etal.,
2008) or to Western science (e.g., Langer, 1989, 1997, 2005, 2009;
Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000a; Haigh etal., 2011). A mind-
ful constructivist approach to the mental health sciences must
be developed by recognizing the cultural and social embedded-
ness of the individual rather than using any single deﬁnition or
set of criteria for human conditions (Langer and Moldoveanu,
2000b). This approach may be the key for the development
of mindful clinical psychology and psychiatry. The data sug-
gest that mindfulness is related to better outcomes for patients
of therapists practicing Zen meditation (Grepmair etal., 2007).
Once having realized that mindfulness can be a key element
in providing better health services, the next question will be
how to encourage health care professionals to learn and practice
mindfulness.
Reiss(2000)suggestedthatmindfulnesshasmotivationalbases;
the most important appears to be a desire to learn (curiosity).
By engaging in mindful thinking, people can satisfy their desire
for curiosity. Other motivational components are: a low need
for an order (allowing for a greater creativity and mental ﬂex-
ibility), and a need for independence, deﬁned as a desire for
self-reliance, allowing the individual to rely on his/her own ideas
and to think more freely and independently from conventions or
external pressures (e.g.,peer pressure and authority). These moti-
vational bases must be used in designing and developing training
programs for psychiatric residents and psychology graduate stu-
dents encouraging them to uphold an open,curious and multiple
perspective (mindful) attitude while investigating the conditions
of their patients. Mindfulness can also be learned by imitating
the behavior of a mindful therapist or supervisor. This further
supports teaching mindfulness to supervisors and health decision
makers.
CONCLUSION
TheDSMshowsbothscientiﬁcandclinicallimits,itswideuseand
the blind approval of its categories and criteria must be carefully
reconsidered.WhentheDSMisused,itmustbeaccompaniedwith
alternative perspectives, emphasizing different aspects of human
suffering including social, environmental, and political dimen-
sions. Clinicians should also be mindful about the strengths and
abilities of their patients and should emphasize their resilience
ratherthantheirperceiveddeﬁcits. Otherdisciplines,namelycog-
nitive and social sciences should be used as a solid foundation of
a new scientiﬁcally driven clinical psychology and psychiatry. It is
time that psychological science moves from the mindless investi-
gation of mental disorders and psychopathology to the mindful
science of mental states and consciousness.
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 602 | 5Khoury etal. The DSM: mindful science or mindless power?
REFERENCES
Abreu, J. M. (1999). Conscious and nonconscious African American stereo-
types: impact on ﬁrst impression and diagnostic ratings by therapists.
J. Consult. Clin. Psychol. 67, 387–393. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.67.
3.387
Anderson, N. H. (1991). “Stereotype theory,” in Contributions to Informa-
tion Integration Theory, ed. N. H. Anderson (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum),
183–240.
Angold, A., and Costello, E. J. (1996). Toward establishing an empiri-
cal basis for the diagnosis of oppositional deﬁant disorder. J. Am. Acad.
Child Adolesc. Psychiatry 35, 1205–1212. doi: 10.1097/00004583-199609000–
00018
Ashton, M. C., and Esses, V. M. (1999). Stereotype accuracy: estimating the aca-
demic performance of ethnic groups. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 25, 225–236. doi:
10.1177/0146167299025002008
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., and Allen, K. (2004). Assessment of mindfulness by self-
report: the Kentucky inventory of mindfulness skills. Assessment 11, 191–206.
doi: 10.1177/107319110426802
Baer, R. A., Smith, G. T., Hopkins, J., Krietemeyer, J., and Toney, L. (2006). Using
self-report assessment methods to explore facets of mindfulness. Assessment 13,
27–45. doi: 10.1177/1073191105283504
Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., and Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social
behavior: direct effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on
action. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 71, 230–244. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.71.
2.230
Beck,A. T.,and Streer,R.A. (1987). Beck Depresion Inventory Manual. SanAntonio,
TX: Psychological Corporation.
Beck, A. T., and Streer, R. A. (1993). Beck Anxiety Inventory Manual. San Antonio,
TX: Psychological Corporation.
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., and Brown, G. K. (1996). Manual for the Beck Depression
Inventory-II. San Antonio, TX: Psychological Corporation.
Beck, A. T., Ward, C. H., Mendelson, M., Mock, J., and Erbaugh, J. (1961). An
inventory for measuring depression. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 4, 561–571. doi:
10.1001/archpsyc.1961.01710120031004
Ben-Zeev, D., Young, M. A., and Corrigan, P. W. (2010). DSM-V and the stigma
of mental illness. J. Ment. Health 19, 318–327. doi: 10.3109/09638237.2010.
492484
Birchwood, M., Trower, P., Brunet, K., Gilbert, P., Iqbal, Z., and Jackson, C.
(2007). Social anxiety and the shame of psychosis: a study in ﬁrst episode
psychosis. Behav. Res. Ther. 45, 1025–1037. doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2006.
07.011
Bloom, B., Cohen, R., and Freeman, G. (2011). Summary Health Statistics for U.S.
Children:NationalHealthInterviewSurvey,2010(DatafromtheNationalHealth
Survey). Vital Health Stat. 250, 1–80.
Blom, M., and Oberink, R. (2012). The validity of the DSM-IV PTSD criteria in
children and adolescents: a review. Clin. Child Psychol. Psychiatry 17, 571–601.
doi: 10.1177/1359104511426408
Bodner, T. E., and Langer, E. J. (2001). “Individual differences in mindfulness: the
mindfulness/mindlessness scale,” in 13th Annual American Psychological Society
Convention, Toronto, ON.
Campbell, D. T. (1958). Common fate, similarity and other indices of the sta-
tus of aggregates of persons as social entities. Behav. Sci. 3, 14–25. doi:
10.1002/bs.3830030103
Carlston,D. E.,and Skowronski,J. J. (1994). Savings in the relearning of trait infor-
mation as evidence for spontaneous inference generation. J.Pers. Soc. Psychol. 66,
840–888. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.66.5.840
Chanowitz, B., and Langer, E. J. (1980). “Knowing more (or less) than you can
show:understandingcontrolthroughthemindlessness/mindfulnessdistinction,”
in Human Helplessness, eds M. Seligman and J. Garber (New York: Academic
Press), 97–130.
Chanowitz, B., and Langer, E. J. (1981). Premature cognitive commitment. J. Pers.
Soc. Psychol. 41, 1051–1063. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.41.6.1051
Chapman, L. J., and Chapman, J. P. (1967). Genesis of popular but erro-
neous psychodiagnostic observations. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 72, 193–204. doi:
10.1037/h0024670
Chapman, L. J., and Chapman, J. P. (1969). Illusory correlation as an obstacle to
the use of valid psychodiagnostic signs. J. Abnorm. Psychol. 74, 271–280. doi:
10.1037/h0027592
Cheniaux, E., Landeira Fernandez, J., and Versiani, M. (2009). The
diagnoses of schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder
and unipolar depression: interrater reliability and congruence between
DSM-IV and ICD-10. Psychopathology 42, 293–298. doi: 10.1159/
000228838
Copeland, W., Shanahan, L., Costello, E. J., and Angold, A. (2011).
Cumulative prevalence of psychiatric disorders by young adulthood: a
prospective cohort analysis from the great smoky mountains study. J. Am.
Acad. Child Adolesc. Psychiatry 50, 252–261. doi: 10.1016/j.jaac.2010.
12.014
Corcoran, J., and Walsh, J. (2010). “Social work and the DSM: person-in-
environment versus the medical model,” in Clinical Assessment and Diagnosis
in Social Work Practice, 2nd Edn (NewYork: Oxford University Press), 11–33.
Corrigan, P. W. (2006). The impact of consumer-operated services on the empow-
erment and recovery of people with psychiatric disabilities. Psychiatr. Serv. 57,
1493–1496. doi: 10.1176/appi.ps.57.10.1493
Corrigan, P. W., Markowitz, F. E., and Watson, A. C. (2004). Structural levels
of mental illness stigma and discrimination. Schizophr. Bull. 30, 481–491. doi:
10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a007096
Corrigan, P. W., River, L. P., Lundin, R. K.,Wasowski, K. U., Campion, J., Mathisen,
J., etal. (2000). Stigmatizing attributions about mental illness. J. Commun.
Psychol. 28, 91–102. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6629(200001)28:1<91::AID-
JCOP9>3.0.CO;2-M
Corrigan, P. W., and Watson, A. C. (2002). The paradox of self-stigma and
mental illness. Clin. Psychol. Sci. Pract. 9, 35–53. doi: 10.1093/clipsy.
9.1.35
Crawford, M. T., Sherman, S. J., and Hamilton, D. L. (2002). Perceived entitativity,
stereotype formation, and the interchangeability of group members. J. Pers. Soc.
Psychol. 83, 1076–1094. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.83.5.1076
Crisp, A. H., Gelder, M. G., Rix, S., Meltzer, H. I., and Rowlands, O. J. (2000).
Stigmatisation of people with mental illnesses. Br. J. Psychiatry 177, 4–7. doi:
10.1192/bjp.177.1.4
Crow, T. J. (1986). The continuum of psychosis and its implication for the
structure of the gene. Br. J. Psychiatry 149, 419–429. doi: 10.1192/bjp.149.
4.419
Dawes, R. M. (1994). House of Cards: Psychology and Psychotherapy Built on Myth.
NewYork, NY: The Free Press.
Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: their automatic and controlled
components. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 56, 5–18. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.5
Dowling, J. F., and Graham, J. R. (1976). Illusory correlation and
the MMPI. J. Pers. Assess. 40, 531–538. doi: 10.1207/s15327752j
pa4005_12
Duman, C. H. (2010). “Chapter one–models of depression,” in Vitamins and
Hormones, ed. L. Gerald (NewYork: Academic Press), 1–21.
Frances, A. (2013). Saving Normal: An Insider’s Revolt Against Out-of-Control Psy-
chiatric Diagnosis, DSM-5, Big Pharma, and the Medicalization of Ordinary Life.
NewYork: William Morrow.
Gilbert, D. T. (1989).“Thinking lightly about others: automatic components of the
socialinferenceprocess,”inUnintendedThought,edsJ.S.Uleman,andJ.A.Bargh
(NewYork: Guilford Press), 189–211.
Gilbert,D.T. (1995).“Attribution and interpersonal perception,”in Advanced Social
Psychology, ed. A. Tesser (NewYork: McGraw-Hill), 99–147.
Greenberg, G. (2013). The Book of Woe: The DSM and the Unmaking of Psychiatry.
NewYork: Blue Rider Press.
Greener,M.(2013). DSM-5:rewritingthe‘bible’. Prog. Neurol. Psychiatry 17,24–26.
doi: 10.1002/pnp.300
Grepmair, L., Mitterlehner, F., Loew, T., Bachler, E., Rother, W., and
Nickel, M. (2007). Promoting mindfulness in psychotherapists in training
inﬂuences the treatment results of their patients: a randomized, double-
blind, controlled study. Psychother. Psychosom. 76, 332–338. doi: 10.1159/
000107560
Haigh, E. A. P., Moore, M., Kashdan, T., and Fresco, D. (2011). Examina-
tion of the factor structure and concurrent validity of the Langer Mind-
fulness/Mindlessness Scale. Assessment 18, 11–26. doi: 10.1177/10731911103
86342
Hamilton, D. L., and Sherman, S. J. (1996). Perceiving persons and
groups. Psychol. Rev. 103, 336–355. doi: 10.1037/0033-295x.103.
2.336
Frontiers in Psychology | Psychology for Clinical Settings June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 602 | 6Khoury etal. The DSM: mindful science or mindless power?
Harding, C. M., and Zahniser, J. H. (1994). Empirical correction
of seven myths about schizophrenia with implications for treatment.
Acta Psychiatr. Scand. 90, 140–146. doi: 10.1111/j.1600-0447.1994.
tb05903.x
Harlow, S. D., and Linet, M. S. (1989). Agreement between questionnaire data
and medical records. The evidence for accuracy of recall. Am. J. Epidemiol. 129,
233–248.
Healy, D., and Williams, J. M. (1988). Dysrhythmia, dysphoria, and depression:
the interaction of learned helplessness and circadian dysrhythmia in the patho-
genesis of depression. Psychol. Bull. 103, 163–178. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.
103.2.163
Hutcherson, C., Seppala, E., and Gross, J. (2008). Loving-kindness meditation
increases social connectedness. Emotion 8, 720–724. doi: 10.1037/a0013237
Jones,E.E.,andHarris,V.A.(1967).Theattributionofattitudes.J.Exp.Soc.Psychol.
3, 1–24. doi: 10.1016/0022-1031(67)90034–90030
Jones, E. E., and Nisbett, R. E. (1987). “The actor and the observer: divergent
perceptions of the causes of behavior,” in Attribution: Perceiving the Causes
of Behavior, eds E. E. Jones, D. E. Kanouse, H. H. Kelley, R. E. Nisbett,
S. Valins, and B. Weiner (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.),
79–94.
Kashima, Y. (2000). Maintaining cultural stereotypes in the serial reproduction
of narratives. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 26, 594–604. doi: 10.1177/0146167
200267007
Keely, J. W., Burgess, D. R., and Blashﬁeld, R. K. (2008). “Diagnostic and statistical
manual of mental disorders (DSM),” in 21st Century Psychology: A Reference
Handbook,edsS.F.DavisandW.Buskist(ThousandOaks,CA:SagePublications),
253–261.
Keller,M. B.,Harrison,W.,Fawcett,J.A.,Gelenberg,A.,Hirschfeld,R. M.,Klein,D.,
etal. (1995). Treatment of chronic depression with sertraline or imipramine:
preliminary blinded response rates and high rates of undertreatment in the
community. Psychopharmacol. Bull. 31, 205–212.
Kelley, H. H. (1967). “Attribution theory in social psychology,” in Nebraska Sym-
posium on Motivation, ed. D. Levine (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press),
129–238.
Kessler, R. C., Berglund, P., Demler, O., Jin, R., Merikangas, K. R., and Walters, E. E.
(2005). Lifetime prevalence and age-of-onset distributions of DSM-IV disorders
inthenationalcomorbiditysurveyreplication.Arch.Gen.Psychiatry 62,593–602.
doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.62.6.593
Ketter, T. (2010). Diagnostic features, prevalence, and impact of bipolar disorder.
J. Clin. Psychiatry 71:e14–e14. doi: 10.4088/JCP.8125tx11c
Lakatos, I. (1970). “Falsiﬁcation and the methodology of scientiﬁc programmes,”
in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, eds I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Lam, R. W., and Stewart, J. N. (1996). The validity of atypical depression in
DSM-IV. Compr. Psychiatry 37, 375–383. doi: 10.1016/S0010-440X(96)90020–
90026
Langdridge, D., and Trevor, B. (2004). The fundamental attribution error:
a phenomenological critique. Br. J. Soc. Psychol. 43, 357–369. doi:
10.1348/0144666042037962
Langer, E. J. (1989). Mindfulness. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo.
Langer, E. J. (1992a). Interpersonal mindlessness and language. Commun. Monogr.
59, 324–327. doi: 10.1080/03637759209376274
Langer, E. J. (1992b). Matters of mind: mindfulness/mindlessness in per-
spective. Conscious. Cogn. 1, 289–305. doi: 10.1016/1053-8100(92)
90066-J
Langer, E. J. (1997). The Power of Mindful Learning. Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley/Addison Wesley Longman.
Langer, E. J. (2000). Mindful learning. C u r r .D i r .P s y c h o l .S c i .9, 220–223. doi:
10.1111/1467-8721.00099
Langer, E. J. (2005). On Becoming an Artist: Reinventing Yourself Through Mindful
Creativity. NewYork,NY: Ballantine Books.
Langer, E. J. (2009). Counterclockwise: Mindful Health and the Power of Possibility.
NewYork,NY: Ballantine Books.
Langer, E. J. (2012). The mindless use of medical data. J. Bus. Res. 65, 1651–1653.
doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2011.02.018
Langer, E. J., Bashner, R., and Chanowitz, B. (1985). Decreasing prejudice by
increasing discrimination. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 49, 113–120. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.49.1.113
Langer, E. J., Blank, A., and Chanowitz, B. (1978). The mindlessness of osten-
sibly thoughtful action: the role of “placebic” information in interpersonal
interaction. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 36, 635–642. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.36.
6.635
Langer, E. J., Cohen, M., and Djikic, M. (2012). Mindfulness as a psychologi-
cal attractor: the effect on children. J. Appl. Soc. Psychol. 42, 1114–1122. doi:
10.1111/j.1559-1816.2011.00879.x
Langer, E. J., and Imber, L. (1979). When practice makes imperfect: the debilitating
effects of overlearning. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 37, 2014–2025. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.37.11.2014
Langer, E. J., and Moldoveanu, M. (2000a). The construct of mindfulness. J. Soc.
Issues 56, 1–9. doi: 10.1111/0022-4537.00148
Langer, E. J., and Moldoveanu, M. (2000b). Mindfulness research
and the future. J. Soc. Issues 56, 129–139. doi: 10.1111/0022-4537.
00155
Langer, E. J., and Newman, H. M. (1979). The role of mindlessness in a typi-
cal social psychological experiment. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 5, 295–298. doi:
10.1177/014616727900500304
Langer, E. J., and Piper, A. I. (1987). The prevention of mindless-
ness. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 53, 280–287. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.53.
2.280
Langer, E. J., and Rodin, J. (1976). The effects of enhanced personal responsibility
for the aged: a ﬁeld experiment in and institutional setting. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol.
34, 191–198. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.34.2.191
Lassiter, F. D., Geers, A. L., Munhall, P. J., Ploutz-Snyder, R. J., and Breitenbecher,
D. L. (2002). Illusory causation: why it occurs. Psychol. Sci. 13, 299–305. doi:
10.1111/j.0956-7976.2002..x
Laungani,P. (2002). Mindless psychiatry and dubious ethics. Couns. Psychol. Q. 15,
23–33. doi: 10.1080/09515070110102305
Link, B. G., and Phelan, J. C. (2001). Conceptualizing stigma. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 27,
363–385. doi: 10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.363
Lolich, M., and Leiderman, E. (2008). Stigmatization towards schizophrenia and
other mental illnesses. Vertex 19, 165–173.
Maiden, R. J. (1987). Learned helplessness and depression: a test of
the reformulated model. J. Gerontol. 42, 60–64. doi: 10.1093/geronj/
42.1.60
Malle, B. F. (2004). How the Mind Explains Behavior: Folk Explanations, Meaning,
and Social Interaction. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Malle, B. F. (2006). The actor–observer asymmetry in attribution: a (surpris-
ing) meta-analysis. Psychol. Bull. 132, 895–919. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.
132.6.895
Malle, B. F., Knobe, J. M., and Nelson, S. E. (2007). Actor–observer
asymmetries in explanations of behavior: new answers to an old ques-
tion. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 93, 491–514. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.93.4.
491.supp
Masuda, T., and Nisbett, R. E. (2001). Attending holistically vs. analytically: com-
paring the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 81,
922–934. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.81.5.922
Michael, W. M., and Kaiping, P. (1994). Culture and cause: American and Chinese
attributions for social and physical events. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 949–971. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.949
Miller, J. G. (1984). Culture and the development of everyday social expla-
nation. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 46, 961–978. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.
46.5.961
Millon, T., Krueger, R. F., and Simonsen, E. (2010). Contemporary Directions in
Psychopathology: ScientiﬁcFoundationsof theDSM-VandICD-11. NewYork,NY:
The Guilford Press.
Mirels,H. L. (1976). Implicit personality theory and inferential illusions. J. Pers. 44,
467–487. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-6494.1976.tb00133.x
Mofﬁtt, T. E., Caspi, A., Taylor, A., Kokaua, J., Milne, B. J., Polanczyk,
G., etal. (2010). How common are common mental disorders? Evidence
that lifetime prevalence rates are doubled by prospective versus retrospec-
tive ascertainment. Psychol. Med. 40, 899–909. doi: 10.1017/S00332917
09991036
Moreno, C., Laje, G., Blanco, C., Jiang, H., Schmidt, A. B., and Olfson, M. (2007).
National trends in the outpatient diagnosis and treatment of bipolar disor-
der in youth. Arch. Gen. Psychiatry 64, 1032–1039. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.64.
9.1032
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 602 | 7Khoury etal. The DSM: mindful science or mindless power?
Morris, M. W., and Peng, K. (1994). Culture and cause: American and Chinese
attributions for social and physical events. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 67, 949–971. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.67.6.949
Moskowitz, G. B. (1993). Individual differences in social categorization:
the inﬂuence of personal need for structure on spontaneous trait infer-
ences. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 65, 132–114. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.65.
1.132
Newman, L. S. (1993). How individualists interpret behavior: idiocen-
trism and spontaneous trait inference. Soc. Cogn. 11, 243–269. doi:
10.1521/soco.1993.11.2.243
Nisbett, R. E., Caputo, C., Legant, P., and Marecek, J. (1973). Behavior as seen
by the actor and as seen by the observer. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 27, 154–164. doi:
10.1037/h0034779
Peterson,C.,andSeligman,M.(2004). CharacterStrengthsandVirtues:AHandbook
and Classiﬁcation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Phelan,J.C.,Link,B.G.,Stueve,A.,andPescosolido,B.A.(2000).Publicconceptions
of mental illness in 1950 and 1996: what is mental illness and is it to be feared?
J. Health Soc. Behav. 41, 188–207. doi: 10.2307/2676305
Pilgrim, D., and Rogers, A. (2005). The troubled relationship between psychi-
atry and sociology. Int. J. Soc. Psychiatry 51, 228–241. doi: 10.1177/0020764
005056987
Pillemer, D. B., and White, S. H. (1989). Childhood events recalled by children and
adults. Adv. Child Dev. Behav. 21,297–340. doi: 10.1016/S0065-2407(08)60291-8
Reed, S. I. (2008). First-episode psychosis: a literature review. Int.
J. Ment. Health Nurs. 17, 85–91. doi: 10.1111/j.1447-0349.2008.
00515.x
Reiss, S. (2000). A mindful approach to mental retardation. J. Soc. Issues 56, 65–80.
doi: 10.1111/0022-4537.00152
Robinson, J., and McArthur, L. Z. (1982). Impact of salient vocal qualities on
causal attribution for a speaker’s behavior. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 43, 236–247. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.43.2.236
Rodin, J., and Langer, E. J. (1977). Long-term effects of a control-relevant inter-
vention among the institutionalized aged. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 35, 897–902. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.35.12.897
Rosenhan, D. L. (1973). On being sane in insane places. Science 179, 250–258. doi:
10.1126/science.179.4070.250
Rosenthal, R., and Fode, K. (1963). The effect of experimenter bias on the
performance of the albino rat. Behav. Sci. 8, 183–189. doi: 10.1002/bs.
3830080302
Ross, L. (1977a). “The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: distortions
in the attribution process,” in Advances in Experimental Social Psychology,e d .
L. Berkowitz (NewYork: Academic Press), 173–220.
Ross, L. (1977b). “The intuitive scientist and his shortcomings,” in Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology, ed. L. Berkowitz (New York: Academic Press),
174–221.
Rothbart, M., Davis-Stitt, C., and Hill, J. (1997). Effects of arbitrarily placed cate-
gory boundaries on similarity judgments. J. Exp. Soc. Psychol. 33, 122–145. doi:
10.1006/jesp.1996.1315
Seligman,M. (1975). Helplessness. San Francisco: W. H. Freeman.
Smith,E.R.,andMiller,F.D.(1979).Salienceandthecognitiveappraisalinemotion.
J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 48, 813–883. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813
Smith, R. (2002). In search of “non-disease.” B r .M e d .J . 324, 883–885. doi:
10.1136/bmj.324.7342.883
Tajfel, H. (1978). Differentiation Between Social Groups: Studies in the Social
Psychology of Intergroup Relations. NewYork: Academic Press.
Uleman, J. S. (1987). Consciousness and control: the case of spontaneous trait
inferences. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 13, 337–354. doi: 10.1177/01461672
87133004
Vieta, E., and Phillips, M. (2007). Deconstructing bipolar disorder: a critical review
of its diagnostic validity and a proposal for DSM-V and ICD-11. Schizophr. Bull.
33, 886–892. doi: 10.1093/schbul/sbm057
Vollmayr, B., and Gass, P. (2013). Learned helplessness: unique features and trans-
lational value of a cognitive depression model. Cell Tissue Res. 354,171–178. doi:
10.1007/s00441-013-1654–1652
Watson,D.(1982).Theactorandtheobserver:Howaretheirperceptionsof causality
divergent? Psychol. Bull. 92, 682–700. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.92.3.682
Weiner, B., Perry, R. P., and Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of
reactions to stigmas. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 55, 738–748. doi: 10.1037/0022-
3514.55.5.738
Willcutt,E.(2012).TheprevalenceofDSM-IVattention-deﬁcit/hyperactivitydisor-
der: a meta-analytic review. Neurotherapeutics 9, 490–499. doi: 10.1007/s13311-
012-0135-8
Winter, L., and Uleman, J. S. (1984). When are social judgements made? Evidence
for the spontaneousness of trait inferences. J. Pers. Soc. Psychol. 47,237–252. doi:
10.1037/0022-3514.47.2.237
Woo, B. S. C., and Rey, J. (2005). The validity of the DSM-IV subtypes of
attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity disorder. Aust. N. Z. J. Psychiatry 39, 344–353.
doi: 10.1111/j.1440-1614.2005.01580.x
Yzerbyt, V. Y., Leyens, J.-P., and Schadron, G. (1997). Social judgeability and the
dilution of stereotypes: the impact of the nature and sequence of information.
Pers. Soc. Psychol. Bull. 23, 1312–1322. doi: 10.1177/01461672972312008
Zinbarg, R. E., Barlow, D. H., Liebowitz, M., Street, L., Broadhead, E., Katon,
W., etal. (1994). The DSM-IV ﬁeld trial for mixed anxiety-depression. Am. J.
Psychiatry 151, 1153–1162.
Zubin, J. (1967). Classiﬁcation of the behaviour disorders. A n n u .R e v .P s y c h o l .18,
373–406. doi: 10.1146/annurev.ps.18.020167.002105
ConflictofInterestStatement:Theauthorsdeclarethattheresearchwasconducted
in the absence of any commercial or ﬁnancial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conﬂict of interest.
Received: 02 March 2014; accepted: 29 May 2014; published online: 17 June 2014.
Citation: Khoury B, Langer EJ and Pagnini F (2014) The DSM: mindful science or
mindlesspower?Acriticalreview.Front.Psychol.5:602.doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00602
This article was submitted to Psychology for Clinical Settings, a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Khoury, Langer and Pagnini. This is an open-access article dis-
tributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original
author(s)orlicensorarecreditedandthattheoriginalpublicationinthisjournaliscited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Psychology for Clinical Settings June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 602 | 8